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Introduction
Common-law countries provide creditors and equity investors with more protection and better enforcement of contracts than civil-law countries (on creditor rights, see, for example, La Porta et al. [1998] ; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007] ; Djankov et al. [2008] ; on other types of financial contracts, see, for example, Lerner and Schoar [2005] and La Porta et al. [1998] ). As a consequence of such greater protection and enforcement, common-law countries have better developed financial systems such that businesses find it easier to raise capital in them. However, it is unclear exactly what feature of common law leads to these benefits. It has been widely argued that the common-law system, with its strong reliance on case law, is inherently quite flexible and, in particular, adapts more quickly to changes in economic conditions than does civil law, which relies on code (see, for example, Priest 1977; Rubin 1977; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003; Levine 2005; Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007; La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer 2008; Ponzetto and Fernandez 2008) . In his summary of the literature, Levine (2005, p. 64) asserts that "a defining trait of British common law is that judges regularly interpret and shape the law as new circumstances arise." Similarly, in their review, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008, p. 305) conclude that "the central strategy of judicial law making is distinguishing cases from precedents, which has an unintended benefit that the law responds to a changing environment."
The analysis of the history of U.S. mortgage laws that I document in this paper instead reveals the remarkable inflexibility of laws developed in case law. I examine the early case law and document when states enacted the various statutes that now govern real estate security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trusts). I explore what led states to adopt a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure as the common procedure the lender uses to foreclose, what led to differences in the time period the borrower has to redeem the property either before or after foreclosure (redemption periods), and what led some states to restrict the lender's recourse to only the property (rather than the property as well as the borrower's other assets and income) in the event of default.
What I find is that the aspects of mortgage law that developed mainly through case law show remarkable persistence. Arguably, the most important creditor right in mortgage law is the ability to foreclose without seeking a judge's approval. In most states, whether a lender can foreclose without a judge's approval is determined in case law, and the case law is established early in states' history, typically before the Civil War. Once there is precedent, the rules regarding the procedure the lender must follow rarely change substantially. Once there is a body of case law, changing the procedure the lender must use to foreclose requires the legislature to change the civil code of procedures. Changing the civil code of procedures is akin to the way law is made in civil-law countries. Rather than adapt quickly to economic conditions, case law can be extremely inflexible, as the history of mortgage laws reveals. In contrast, aspects of mortgage law that are determined by statute, such as how long the borrower has to get the property back after a foreclosure sale, change much more over time.
These more frequent statutory interventions almost always aim to benefit debtors at the expense of creditors. Legal scholars have long understood that legislatures tend to interfere with private debt contracts in such a populist fashion. As Thurgood Marshall argued in 1827 (Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 334-35 [1827] ), the interventions of state legislatures denigrate creditors' rights and threaten the advancement of commerce:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes to proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess by the State legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith.
In the history of U.S. mortgage laws, I find no early examples in which state legislatures interfered with private contracts to benefit creditors at the expense of debtors; the only interventions in which state legislatures enacted a statute to enhance creditor rights are a handful of deed-of-trust statutes in the latter half of the 20th century and early 21st century. In contrast, three sets of evidence are consistent with legislatures passing statutes abrogating creditors' rights in response to populist pressure.
First, in the few instances in which I find that foreclosure switched from being a nonjudicial process to a process requiring judicial approval, the change usually happened through statute rather than judicial rulings. Second, in the 1930s, many state legislatures passed antideficiency statutes, which restricted the right of creditors to pursue a borrower in default personally such that the creditor's only recourse became the mortgaged property. Consistent with such laws being a result of populist pressure, I find that farm foreclosure rates and the share of out-of-state credit predict whether a legislature passed such a statute. State judiciaries often struck down these statutes, however. In all such instances in which an antideficiency statute was meant to apply retroactively, judges intervened to preserve the integrity of private contracts. In at least one instance, a judge went further and prevented the law from applying to future mortgages. Finally, as has been established by Alston (1983 Alston ( , 1984 , the foreclosure moratoria of the 1930s were acts of legislatures responding to widespread farm mortgage distress. Similar to their reaction to antideficiency statutes, judges deemed many of the foreclosure moratoria unconstitutional. In essence, in the history of mortgage law, the judiciary serves to restrain the populist impulses of state legislatures.
The history of U.S. mortgage law is not the only evidence that aspects of case law make the common-law system inflexible. In their study of private limitedliability companies (PLLCs), Guinnane et al. (2008) find that the United States was extremely slow to adopt PLLCs because of precedents in case law forbidding them. The comparison of the contracting environments in 19th-century America and France by Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) also challenges the notion that the common-law legal system is inherently more flexible than legal systems based on a civil code. Malmendier (2009) finds that law in the early Roman Republic, often seen as the precursor to the civil-law system (see La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer 2008) , adapted frequently to business needs. Given the extremely early date at which I find that foreclosure procedures were established, it is safe to treat differences in some state mortgage laws, at least at present, as exogenous, which may provide economists with a useful instrument for studying the effect of differences in creditor rights (see, for example, Pence 2006; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011) . Furthermore, the extent to which a credi-tor's right to nonjudicial foreclosure is determined in case law, and the relative lack of case law's response to populist pressures, suggests that it is uncorrelated with economic fundamentals more than a century later. More generally, the distinction I find between the effects of economic circumstances on statutes relative to their influence on case law suggests that differences in state laws that arose through case law are more plausibly exogenous than differences in state laws that arose through statute.
Section 2 of this paper describes the nature of mortgage contracts and foreclosure processes in the United States, defines some basic terminology, and provides a summary of how creditor friendly the mortgage laws are in each state at present. Section 3 shows that the creditor's right to power-of-sale foreclosure emerged largely in case law and rarely changes over time. It also documents that statutory redemption rights, which are exclusively determined in statute, change much more frequently. Section 4 discusses the reaction of legislatures to populist pressures in the 1930s and judges' responses to the legislation. Section 5 concludes.
Mortgage Laws in America Today
The laws across U.S. states differ in the legal theory underlying the mortgage contract and in how they balance the rights of creditors with those of borrowers. Despite at least five distinct attempts over the years to create a uniform mortgage code, mortgages today continue to be governed by a very diverse set of state laws.
1 Table 1 summarizes the dimensions of mortgage laws along which states differ and the extent to which an aspect of mortgage law is pro-creditor.
The first difference across states is in the legal theory underpinning the mortgage. What is commonly termed a mortgage consists of two legal documents. The specific terms under which the borrower must repay the loan are contained in the promissory note. The borrower is known in legal terms as the mortgagor, and the creditor is referred to as the mortgagee. In a title-theory state, the mortgage provides the mortgagee ownership of the property until the borrower has paid off the debt. If a state follows title theory, the lender retains title to the property until such time as the borrower pays off the mortgage. Under lien theory, the mortgage merely provides the lender with a lien on the property; the borrower owns the property during the duration of the mortgage, and the lender's interest in the property is limited to situations in which the borrower defaults on the mortgage. Table A1 and Figure A1 document that older states tend to follow title theory, and younger states usually follow lien theory. While the distinction between title 1 Durfee and Doddridge (1925) and Pomeroy (1926) discuss at length the provisions of a uniform mortgage act. This act does not ever seem to have been passed. Reeve (1938) argues for the need for a uniform real estate mortgage act. That act too does not seem to have become law. Schwartz (1972) notes the proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act, which was never adopted. Bernhardt (1992) discusses the provisions of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act of 1985, which has yet to be adopted by any state. Nelson and Whitman (2004) and lien theory no longer has any substantial effect on the balance of power between borrower and creditor, different legal theories nevertheless require different mortgage documents, which adds to the paperwork burden of national lenders.
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States also differ in whether the standard real estate security instrument is a mortgage or a deed of trust, although the term "mortgage" refers to both instruments in everyday usage. In most states, the standard way to finance a property is with a mortgage. However, in some states the standard instrument is a deed of trust wherein the legal title to the property is entrusted to a third party known as the trustee. Unlike a mortgage, for which there are only two parties, there are three parties in a deed-of-trust transaction. In a deed-of-trust state, the trustee sells the property if the borrower defaults. In states that follow the lien theory of mortgages, the equitable title nevertheless remains with the borrower. The main reason some states use a deed of trust rather than a mortgage is because, as I discuss in greater detail below, when lenders began including power-of-sale clauses in mortgages, some judges viewed it as improper for the lender to be able to sell the property.
When a borrower becomes delinquent on her mortgage, there are two main factors that affect the speed with which the lender can take possession of the property. First, some states require the lender to go to court and receive a judge's approval to foreclose (judicial foreclosure). In other states, the lender may sell the property if the mortgage contains a power-of-sale clause, or, if a deed of trust is the standard real estate finance instrument, the trustee is obliged to sell the 2 The existence of title theory is a product of the evolution of mortgage laws in England. In medieval England, in the most common form of mortgage, the lender received the rents and profits from the land to satisfy the debt. This prevented the contract from being seen as one in which the borrower was paying interest per se to the lender, which thus ensured that the contract was not usurious (Glaeser and Scheinkman 1998) . Until the early 16th century, all lending at interest was forbidden, although occasional exceptions were made for money lending by Jews to gentiles (Temin and Voth 2008) . As a result, it was crucial that the mortgage contract be structured in such a way that the contract did not violate usury laws. The mortgage contract evolved into a conditional conveyance (Jones 1878) in the sense of the property conveying to the borrower only on satisfaction of the debt rather than merely serving as collateral in the event the borrower failed to make timely interest and principal payments. This structure further differentiated the contract from an interest-bearing loan. The advantage of title theory in medieval England was thus that the payment of rents and profits on land to which the lender had title prevented the lender from being in violation of usury laws. 3 Even in power-of-sale states, however, the lender usually can pursue judicial foreclosure if it chooses. Given the higher transaction costs and time to foreclose associated with judicial foreclosure, however, lenders usually foreclose nonjudicially if state law permits it without any additional burdens relative to judicial foreclosure. Lenders in a power-of-sale state might choose to use judicial foreclosure if there is a problem with the title to the property. Some states also require the lender to pursue judicial foreclosure if it wants to obtain a deficiency judgment, as I discuss later in this section. Finally, some states that technically permit power-ofsale foreclosure give the borrower greater redemption rights under power-of-sale foreclosure or impose other burdens on lenders if they foreclose by power of sale such that they more commonly choose judicial foreclosure.
The second main factor that affects the speed with which a lender can foreclose is redemption rights. A redemption right is the right of the borrower to redeem the property by paying off the entire balance of the mortgage. A redemption period is a period during which the borrower has redemption rights. If the redemption period precedes the foreclosure sale, the right of the borrower to redeem during that time is known as an equitable redemption right. Such a right might take the form of requiring the lender to wait, say, 6 months after the first serious delinquency before it can foreclose. In practice, most states have some equitable redemption period that arises because of long notification and advertisement requirements, although some might not necessarily term these waiting times equitable redemption periods. Many states also allow the borrower some time period after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property. The borrower's right to redeem the property for some specified number of months after the foreclosure sale is known as a statutory redemption right. Because statutory redemption rights cloud the title of the property for prospective buyers at the foreclosure auction, they are arguably more problematic for lenders than are equitable redemption rights.
Finally, some states have laws that restrict the rights of lenders to pursue a residential borrower personally to recover the debt owed to the lender. For example, suppose a borrower defaults on a mortgage of $300,000, and the fair market value of the property is only $200,000. The borrower still owes the lender $100,000 after the lender seizes the property. To recover the $100,000, the lender in most states can obtain a deficiency judgment, which will enable it to seize any other assets the borrower has and garnish the borrower's wages. In some states, the lender automatically receives a deficiency judgment if the value of the property is not adequate to cover the debt owed, but in most states the lender must file a lawsuit to obtain a deficiency judgment. A mortgage in which the lender can get a deficiency judgment is generally known as a recourse mortgage. If there is no specific clause in the promissory note that establishes a nonrecourse mortgage, a clause known as an exculpatory clause, the mortgage is a recourse mortgage unless state statute overrides it. Exculpatory clauses are not generally used in U.S. residential mortgages, although they are common in commercial mortgages. States that have sweeping antideficiency statutes that effectively make mortgages nonrecourse are known as nonrecourse states. Table 2 illustrates the diversity across states in mortgage laws and provides a crude index of the extent to which a state's laws are pro-creditor; Figure 1 presents the information geographically. I score states on a 4-point system. I award 2 points for the foreclosure procedure usually used. I award states permitting power-of-sale foreclosure with minimal restrictions 2 points. I award 1 point to the two states that offer a creditor-friendly form of judicial foreclosure known as scire facias, Delaware and Pennsylvania. Section 3 explains why Delaware and Pennsylvania developed this unusual form of judicial foreclosure. It differs from other forms of judicial foreclosure in that the onus is on the borrower to provide a reason why the lender should not be able to foreclose. The figures Russell and Bridewell (1938) present on the cost and time it took in the 1930s to foreclose in Delaware and Pennsylvania support the idea that this is an expedient if not a cheap procedure. States in which judicial foreclosure is the norm receive no points for the foreclosure procedure. The source for the data is the USFN (2008) .
The primacy of power-of-sale foreclosure in the scoring system reflects its prominence in the most recent foreclosure crisis and the literature surrounding it. A sudden increase in the number of foreclosures, such as that observed during the financial crisis of 2007-9, can overwhelm a judicial system and lead to substantial delays in the lender's ability to recover its collateral. Using data from the recent foreclosure crisis, Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011) find that the availablity of judicial foreclosure decreases the number of foreclosures. There are economic consequences of this availability even if, as Gerardi, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen (2013) argue, judicial foreclosure only delays, instead of prevents, foreclosures. Because of the debt-overhang problem (see Melzer 2012) , a delay in foreclosing implies that the property will be in worse condition by the time the lender recovers its collateral. Perhaps because of these reasons, Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2013) document differences in home price dynamics between judicial and nonjudicial states.
One point is awarded if the state permits deficiency judgments without substantial restrictions. I allocate only 1 point for this aspect of foreclosure laws, as recourse provisions affect primarily higher-income borrowers. Although Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) show that state laws that restrict deficiency judgments increase the risk of foreclosure, they find that it matters only for home values of $200,000 or more. They also find that recourse affects the lender's ability to get the borrower to agree to a deed in lieu of foreclosure or a short sale. With the exception of Nevada, the state classification here follows the scheme of Ghent Note. States are classified according to laws in place for residential mortgages originated in 2010 or later. Scores are awarded as follows: 4 = most creditor-friendly laws, 0 = least creditor-friendly laws; power-of-sale foreclosure is the usual procedure = 2, deficiency judgments are permitted without substantial restrictions = 1, statutory redemptionis usually less than 6 months = 1. Although Delaware and Pennsylvania require judicial foreclosure, their scire facias is unusually creditor friendly and so is awarded 1 point rather than 0; North Carolina permits deficiency judgments on refinanced mortgages but forbids them on purchase mortgages and so is awarded .5 point, as it permits deficiency judgments on refinanced mortgages but forbids them on purchase mortgages. and Kudlyak (2011). Nevada changed to a nonrecourse state after the end of their sample period (see Li and Oswald 2014) . I award North Carolina .5 point rather than no points, as it permits deficiency judgments on mortgages used to refinance an existing mortgage on a property but bans them on mortgages used to purchase a property. Finally, I award 1 point if the state has no statutory redemption period or a redemption period of less than 6 months. The data source for statutory redemption rights is USFN (2008) . Figure 1 and Table 2 reveal substantial heterogeneity within census regions in the degree to which mortgage laws are creditor friendly. Although midwestern (West North Central and East North Central) states have the least creditor-friendly laws, even within these regions there is substantial heterogeneity. The heterogeneity across geographically similar states is due to what La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008, p. 286) refer to as the "well-known judicial arbitrariness in common law countries." As Section 4 demonstrates, the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure, which makes up half of the creditor rights score, is largely decided in case law and is thus subject to the preferences of an individual judge. Similarly, while various legislatures attempted to pass antideficiency statutes, individual judges decided differently as to the constitutionality of such statutes despite circumstances appearing quite similar in different states.
Foreclosure Procedures

Historical Background
For the first mortgages in America, foreclosure was an exclusively judicial process, and in all of the 13 original colonies that had chancery courts (also known as equity courts), only what is now known as strict foreclosure was available. the contract. Early in the history of the equity of redemption, there seems to have been no limitation on the time frame during which the borrower could redeem his property (Jones 1878) . Eventually, the lender could petition a court of equity to set a date by which the borrower had to repay the principle, interest, and fees. If the borrower had not completed payment by that date, he would forever lose his right to redeem the property, and the conveyance to the lender would become unconditional (Williams 1866) . Such an end was known as foreclosure before the modern usage of foreclosure by sale.
As a result of difficulties in obtaining a strict foreclosure, at some point in the 18th century British lenders began asking the courts to agree to a sale in lieu of foreclosure. A sale in lieu of foreclosure ensured that the borrower would receive any value of the property in excess of that required to pay off the debt such that the borrower did not forfeit his estate altogether. In the absence of well-developed land and financial markets with small parcel sizes, many borrowers would have had positive equity, and a sale in lieu of foreclosure would have been fairer to the borrower. The success of sales in lieu of foreclosure eventually led to the insertion of power-of-sale clauses into many mortgages to further encourage chancellors to grant a sale in lieu of redemption.
With the exception of Connecticut, which still requires strict foreclosure, American states rapidly embraced the concept of a foreclosure sale rather than strict foreclosure. As foreclosure by sale grew in popularity, many states permitted the borrower a statutory right of redemption wherein the borrower could regain possession of the property after a foreclosure sale by repaying the principal, interest, and fees.
Power-of-Sale Foreclosure
Early on, a foreclosure sale still necessitated the approval of a judiciary. Gradually, however, courts came to respect power-of-sale clauses inserted in mortgages or trust deeds in many states. A landmark U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Newman vs. Jackson (25 U.S. 570 [1827]) favored power-of-sale clauses in regulating a dispute in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C., and set a precedent for other states. Despite this precedent, it took decades for many states to rule that powerof-sale foreclosure was valid or to begin using power-of-sale clauses. However, by 1863 lenders were able to foreclose by a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure in many states (J.F.D. 1863). Table 3 summarizes the use of power-of-sale foreclosure in selected years.
The similarities between the laws in the different periods are striking. Of the 37 states for which I have data from 1863, only nine states (Oregon, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Illinois, New York, Georgia, South Carolina, Maine, and New Hampshire) changed their stance on power-of-sale clauses substantially between 1863 and 2008. As I discuss below, early Wisconsin case law makes me question the assertion in J.F.D. (1863) that power-of-sale foreclosure was "usual" in 1863 and that only eight states truly changed their foreclosure laws. The median number of changes is 0, and the mean is less than .5. Jones (1879 Jones ( , 1904 Jones ( , 1915 Jones ( , 1928 ; Russell and Bridewell (1938) ; Skilton (1943); Prather (1957) Figure 2 maps the states that had adopted power of sale or deeds of trust by 1863. There is no obvious geographical pattern. There is also no significant correlation between either the state's age or whether the state follows the title theory of mortgages or the lien theory of mortgages and whether it allows nonjudicial foreclosure as of 1863. The absence of any clear geographical pattern or basis in the theory of the mortgage makes it necessary to carefully examine the case law and relevant statutes to better understand the divergence in legal development.
As Drummy (1976, p. 90 ) eloquently states, "the power of sale is considered a right of contractual agreement rather than one of legislative invention" such that, in most cases, the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure and deeds of trust is determined in case law rather than by statute. Consequently, often the decision of a single judge often ends up determining the process. For example, despite the national Supreme Court precedent in 1827, Justice Loyal C. Kellogg of the Supreme Court of Vermont declared that a power-of-sale clause was not generally valid in Wing v. Cooper (37 Vt. 169, 183-84 [1864] ). Kellogg's reasoning was as follows:
A power of sale given by a mortgage deed is not an ordinary power, and as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, it should be strictly construed. In this state, it is in practice unusual if not unknown. We have no statute regulating its exercise, and a sale under it might be made without the concurrence of the mortgagor, and even without notice to him. It is too important a power to rest upon implication and local reasoning, and ought not, as we think, to be recognized in any case unless it is conveyed by an express grant and in clear and explicit terms.
While this ruling did not exactly forbid power-of-sale clauses, which would have been inconsistent with the national precedent, the interpretation of the ruling banned them for all practical purposes. Without the legislature intervening to regulate the exercise of power-of-sale foreclosure, the ruling seems to make it impossible to enforce a power-of-sale clause. Table 4 summarizes the early case law and statutes that exerted such a permanent influence on the practicability of power-of-sale foreclosure. Examination of the cases reveals that, with rare exceptions, judges upheld the validity of power-of-sale clauses inserted in mortgages. In only six states (Vermont, Florida, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Utah, and Nebraska) did judges rule in such a way as to make the exercise of power-of-sale clauses impossible or impractical. In the case of Iowa, judges went further in essentially overturning a statutory ban; the legislature enacted a new ban on power-of-sale foreclosure shortly thereafter.
Furthermore, once the validity of power-of-sale foreclosure is decided in case law, the case law governing its use does not substantively change unless there is a statutory intervention. To the extent that the laws on power-of-sale foreclosure change at all, they do so because of statute. Legislatures usually act to abrogate the ability of parties to enter into contractual agreements with power-of-sale clauses rather than to preserve the rights of creditors. For example, the legislature of Oregon intervened in 1862 to require mortgages to be foreclosed in a court of law. Similar statutes were passed in Arizona (1913) v. Wood, 45 N.Y. 71 [1871] ). The reason that New York now uses judicial foreclosure is that the legislature instituted increasingly onerous statutes that creditors had to follow to exercise a power-of-sale clause (Jones 1879, pp. 604-8) .
The instances in which the legislature intervenes to make power-of-sale foreclosure illegal or impractical reveal of the responsiveness of legislators to debtors rather than creditors. In an unusually early statute, Kentucky banned power-ofsale foreclosure in 1820. As Thorp (1926) discusses, 1819-21 was marked by record low commodity prices, financial panic, and a collapse in real estate values. As a rapidly expanding western state at that time, it is likely that Kentucky was heavily reliant on out-of-state credit, and the legislature may have been responding to populist demands from farmers for relief. Data from the U.S. census reveal that Kentucky's population grew by almost 40 percent between 1810 and 1820. Kentucky was very agrarian and heavily dependent on slave labor; U.S. census records from 1820 indicate that more than one-fifth of Kentucky's population consisted of slaves. Substantial capital would have been required to purchase the slaves, which made Kentucky reliant on out-of-state capital. In a time of distress, and without settled case law on the matter, the legislature favored domestic borrowers over out-of-state creditors.
The states that passed statutes making power-of-sale foreclosure difficult to enforce in the second half of the 19th century are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Kansas. Although these states passed anti-power-of-sale statutes at different points during the last half of the 19th century, all of these states were heavily dependent on out-of-state credit, and fear of foreclosure featured prominently in agrarian unrest (see Stock 1984) . Legislatures responded to such foreclosure fears by reducing the risk of foreclosure for their constituents at the expense of creditors from out of state. The reason legislatures could intervene in these cases is that the states were young enough that there was no well-established case law upholding power-of-sale clauses.
Several state legislatures intervened during the Great Depression. At the beginning of the Great Depression, the legislature of New Mexico intervened to make power-of-sale foreclosure illegal. North Dakota banned nonjudicial foreclosure in 1933 (Vogel 1984) as part of wide-ranging farm foreclosure relief. As Alston (1983) points out, North Dakota had an unusually high farm foreclosure rate during the Great Depression, which suggests that its ban on foreclosure was also a populist measure. The South Carolina legislature passed a statute effectively banning power-of-sale foreclosure in 1932. The West Virginia legislature attempted to make power-of-sale foreclosure illegal in 1933, but the courts deemed the act unconstitutional (Poteat 1938 [1853] ) are clear that power-of-sale clauses do not obviate the jurisdiction of chancery courts to decide the correct way to dispose of a property. Indeed, the judge in Walton v. Cody seems to suggest that the equity of redemption resides with the mortgagor and "will expire by the limitations which the [mortgagor] himself has prescribed" (1 Wis. 434). Since the debtor remained in possession of the property during the 24-month equitable redemption period, nonjudicial foreclosure was impractical. The claim by J.F.D. (1863) that nonjudicial foreclosure was "usual" is also not supported by evidence suggesting that Wisconsin may never have truly been a power-of-sale foreclosure state. As a result, the change in Wisconsin is not a sudden reversal.
Even when economic circumstances changed to make power-of-sale foreclosure convenient, the shift away from judicial foreclosure could not be accomplished by case law. Rather, the wording of earlier statutes banning power-of-sale foreclosure permitted certain legislatures to introduce a new real estate finance instrument, the deed of trust, to permit power-of-sale foreclosure. In particular, Oregon (1961) , Utah (1961) , Arizona (1971) , and New Mexico (2006) passed deed-of-trust statutes to circumvent the previous statutes in these states, which applied only to mortgages.
Statutory Redemption Periods
As foreclosure by sale became the normal procedure to foreclose-both in situations in which the mortgage contained a power-of-sale clause and in judicial foreclosure-legislatures interceded to protect borrowers by enacting statutory redemption periods. There are more changes to redemption rights over time than to the availability of power-of-sale foreclosure because, unlike power-of-sale clauses, redemption periods are set by statute rather than settled primarily in case law. Table 5 summarizes the changes in the rights of redemption over time.The average number of changes is .88 and the median number of changes is 1. 6 Although more flexible than power-of-sale foreclosure, highlighting the importance of early institutional developments, redemption periods are surprisingly persistent. More than half of all states did not change their policy on redemption periods substantially between the first available date for which I have data, typically before the Civil War, and 1938. Since 1938 there have been more Only Connecticut increased the redemption period by inserting a 3-month period for equitable right of redemption. It seems that institutional inertia rather than any other factor has led many states to retain their rights of redemption from the 19th century. Unlike the pattern in nonjudicial foreclosure, there is more geographical clustering of redemption rights, as Figure 3 shows. I chose 1904 as the date to illustrate rather than 1879, the earliest date with available data, to allow the effect of the mortgage distress of the 1890s to be reflected. The greater influence of geography in redemption rights owes to legislatures responding more than judges to regionalized mortgage distress. While not a perfect mapping, western stateswhich were more reliant on out-of-state credit and had more farm mortgage distress-tended to have more generous redemption periods than did states in the Northeast.
Some states allowed the borrower 2 years or more, while others afforded the borrower no grace period. The borrower usually retained possession of the property until the expiry of the redemption rights (see Russell and Bridewell 1938) . In some cases, attempts by states to provide for a redemption period were deemed unconstitutional by the courts, such as the attempt by Missouri to allow borrowers a 30-month redemption period (Skilton 1943) .
To summarize, the validity of power-of-sale clauses was usually initially determined in case law, and judges usually deemed contracts with them legitimate. Absent an intervention by the legislature, the case law on power-of-sale foreclosure almost never changed over time despite evolving economic circumstances. Rather, changes in the validity of power-of-sale clauses were accomplished by statute and usually undermined creditors' rights in response to populist pressures. In contrast, redemption rights, which are determined by statute in a process similar to that in civil countries, change more frequently and reflect more populist influences.
The Great Depression: Antideficiency Statutes and Statutory Moratoria
The farm and home mortgage distress of the Great Depression presented a unique challenge for state legislators and judges. Legislatures almost universally intervened in a way aimed to benefit current mortgagors and, to the extent the restrictions led lenders to restrict the supply of credit (see Pence 2006) , future mortgagors. I have already noted the interventions of New Mexico and North Dakota to ban nonjudicial foreclosure during the 1930s. Poteat (1938) documents that 31 other state legislatures intervened on behalf of debtors in the 1930s. Much of the statutory relief was meant to abrogate private contracts to which both parties had agreed. The statutes mostly consisted of restrictions on deficiency judgments, foreclosure moratoria, or both. As I will show, judges tempered legislators' zeal for relieving debtors of their burdens at the expense of creditors. 
Antideficiency Statutes
Until the Great Depression, there were few restrictions on deficiency judgments. As of 1879, in most states and territories the lender was free to pursue "all his remedies concurrently or successively" (Jones 1879, p. 2:233) . By that time, it had become standard for an American mortgage to consist of both a note and the mortgage itself, and the lender could both sue on the note and seize the property (Jones 1879, vol. 2, chap. 27) , often simultaneously. Only in California and Colorado did the lender have only one remedy (Jones 1879, vol. 2, chap. 30) , what is now known as the one-action rule, and only in California could the lender take an action precluding it from the right to a deficiency judgment. In Minnesota and Nevada the borrower had to exhaust the property before suing on the note (Jones 1879, vol. 2, chap. 27) , which is somewhat similar in effect to the one-action rule. In Dakota Territory, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, and Washington Territory, the lender could not simultaneously sue on the promissory note and file a lawsuit for foreclosure; the lender could pursue actions in the sequence of its choice, however.
The more moderate antideficiency statutes of the 1930s consisted of fairmarket-value provisions. A fair-market-value provision is a requirement that, regardless of the value of the winning bid at the foreclosure sale, the borrower receives credit for the fair market value of the property in determining the size of the deficiency judgment. Although some states' codes had fair-market-value restrictions prior to the 1930s (see Skilton 1942), during 1933-35, Alabama, Idaho, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and  Texas all modified their statutes to include a fair-market-value provision (Poteat 1938) . Without a fair-market-value provision, creditors can abuse deficiency judgments as, unlike their British counterparts, American lenders could bid at a sale in lieu of foreclosure. Often, they were the only bidders and bid far less than the value of the debt or the fair market value of the property, which left borrowers liable for the deficiency. Since foreclosure by sale had become the standard procedure, with the lender often the only bidder, this left the borrower exposed to the risk that he would both lose his property and owe a substantial deficiency judgment in excess of his true debt if the lender bid less than the debt. Skilton (1942) and Vaughan (1940) detail several such cases of lenders bidding amounts far lower than the fair market value of property.
Consistent with preventing such abuses, judges in the 1930s deemed many of the antideficiency statutes with fair-market-value restrictions constitutional provided that the statute was limited to a fair-market-value restriction and did not otherwise infringe on the enforcement of the mortgage contract. Judges declared the fair-market-value restrictions in the statutes of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas to be unconstitutional as impairments of the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution. In the case of New Jersey, this was likely because the act also included several other procedural requirements on deficiency judgments such that courts determined that the law would have been a de facto violation of the contracts clause. Similarly, the Pennsylvania statute contained a num-ber of procedural restrictions on the foreclosure process. The Supreme Court of South Carolina judge determined in Federal Land Bank v. Garrison (185 S.C. 255, 193 S.E. 308 [1937] ) that, because the act included a fair-market-value provision written in such a way as to apply retroactively, the entire act was unconstitutional and thus null and void. The Texas law may have been declared unconstitutional because of the vague language of the law; the law required the borrower to get credit for the "actual value" of the property.
Many states went much further in restricting the rights of lenders in deficiency judgments during the Great Depression. The appendix in Poteat (1938) provides a state-by-state account of the antideficiency statutes and the case law surrounding them as of 1938. The legislatures of Iowa and Ohio set a statute of limitations of 2 years on when the creditor could collect on the deficiency judgment. Michigan passed a statute mandating that the lender use judicial foreclosure if it wished to secure a deficiency judgment. Georgia enacted a statute requiring that the deficiency judgment be filed within 30 days of the foreclosure sale if the lender had used a power-of-sale clause to foreclose. A number of states (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Dakota) attempted to prohibit deficiency judgments entirely during the 1933-35 period, often only for purchase mortgages.
The case of Arkansas provides an insightful illustration of why some states' attempts to ban deficiency judgments were successful and others were not. In Arkansas, as in other states, the statute was intended to apply to current mortgages. The court in Arkansas, as in most other states, struck down the constitutionality of any restriction on the lender's right to a deficiency judgment on mortgages entered into before the legislature passed the statute, as that would violate the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, in most states judges upheld the constitutionality of the law as it applied to future mortgages. In Adams v. Spillyards (187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686, 649-50 [1933] ), however, Judge Edgar L. McHaney of the Supreme Court of Arkansas prevented the act from any permanent effects by writing, Now, as to its application to future contracts, or to mortgages and deeds of trust on real estate executed subsequent to the effective date of the act, we think a careful examination of the act itself discloses that it has no application to the foreclosure of such contracts or mortgages. It does not in express terms apply to foreclosures on mortgages and deeds of trust on real estate to be hereafter executed, but apparently to foreclosures on contracts already in existence. In fact, the words "mortgage" or "deed of trust" are nowhere used in the act. Foreclosures on real estate are several times mentioned, and foreclosures on mechanics' liens and purchase money liens are covered as well as mortgages and deeds of trust. The evident purpose of the Legislature was to relieve a present condition by applying the poultice of the act to the sore spot of deficiency judgments in foreclosures of mortgages, caused by decline in realty values. They made it expressly applicable to cases of foreclosure now pending and sales already made but not confirmed, which could not possibly have reference to future contracts, (section 3); and also to "suits filed after the effective date of this act and real property is sold under foreclosure decree of courts fore-closing same, said sale shall not be confirmed," etc. The whole context, we think, shows the Legislature was dealing with what it deemed a temporary emergency.
Thus, a seemingly minor difference in wording between the antideficiency statute of Arkansas and those of states like Arizona and California led to permanent differences in foreclosure law and outcomes. The Arizona, California, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and North Dakota prohibitions continue to this day.
Comparing the restrictions above with those Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) report for 2009, we can see that virtually all of the restrictions on deficiency judgments other than some states' fair-market-value provisions date from the foreclosure crisis of the early 1930s. To better understand why states differed in whether they tried to enact a ban on deficiency judgments, I look at foreclosure rates from the 1931-32 period using data from farm mortgages and the importance of out-ofstate farm mortgage credit in 1930. The data for farm foreclosure rates are from Stauber and Reagan (1935) and include foreclosures because of tax liens. Deeds in lieu are counted as foreclosures. See Alston (1983 Alston ( , 1984 for more discussion of farm foreclosures in the Great Depression.
To proxy for the relative importance of out-of-state capital, I compute the 1930 ratio of total farm mortgages in the state to real estate mortgages made by banks in that state. A high ratio indicates that the state is more dependent on out-ofstate capital. The hypothesis is that legislators are more responsive to their own electorate than to individuals who live in another state and are unable to exact vengeance on pro-debtor legislators at the voting booth. The data on the volume of farm mortgages are from Horton, Larsen, and Wall (1942) , and the banking data are from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959).
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I estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable takes a value of one if the state attempted to prohibit deficiency judgments and zero otherwise. I view the decisions by courts regarding the constitutionality of the prohibition to be primarily idiosyncratic results of different judges rather than the concerted efforts of state legislators. As a result, even if the attempt to prohibit deficiency judgments failed, I code the dependent variable as one. I estimate the model using the combined foreclosure rate for 1931 and 1932, although the results are very similar when I use the combined foreclosure rate for 1931-33 or the combined foreclosure rate for 1931-34.
The first column of Table 6 contains the results of the benchmark probit estimates. The table shows the effect of a 1-unit change on the probability that the state attempted to ban deficiency judgments estimated at the means of foreclosure rates. An increase of 10 foreclosures per 1,000 farms per year is associated with a 6-percentage-point higher chance of attempting to enact a ban on deficiency judgments, and the coefficient on the farm foreclosure rate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in every specification. The share of loans pro-vided by out-of-state creditors also influenced whether the state attempted to ban deficiency judgments. The coefficient on Out-of-State Credit is statistically significant at only the 10 percent level for one specification. The reason for the weak statistical significance of Out-of-State Credit is likely because the two variables are highly correlated. As Table 7 illustrates, the correlation between the proxy for out-of-state credit and the foreclosure rate is 44 percent.
One concern with Out-of-State Credit is that it may be partially capturing the importance of agriculture to the state rather than merely the extent to which the state depends on out-of-state capital. To my knowledge, there is no reason to believe that a more agrarian state would be more likely to follow populist policies. However, Table 7 shows that the correlation between Out-of-State Credit and the share of the state's population that was rural according to the 1930 U.S. census is 48 percent. To address the possibility that Out-of-State Credit is proxying for how agrarian the state is, another probit model includes the share of the population that was rural to better capture the extent to which creditors were nonvoters. The results are very similar to the benchmark specification, and the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
Foreclosure Moratoria
During the Great Depression, the majority of state legislatures also enacted foreclosure moratoria. The moratoria varied in character and included a temporary increase in the statutory redemption period, a stay on all foreclosures until a specific date (for example, 1935), a stay on all foreclosures for an unspecified period of time (for example, "until the emergency has passed"), and a grant of more discretion to judges in deciding whether a foreclosure suit could proceed. In many cases the moratoria were voluntary (Skilton 1943) . Alston (1984) shows that states with higher farm foreclosure rates were more likely to enact such moratoria, while Rucker and Alston (1987) demonstrate that these moratoria successfully prevented farm foreclosures. However, Alston (1984) also shows that creditors reacted by providing less new mortgage credit. These findings are consistent with the assertion in this paper that statutory law reacts to populist sentiment to the disadvantage of creditors.
What is perhaps less appreciated is how state judiciaries reacted to such moratoria. Bunn (1933 Bunn ( ), D.P.K. (1933 , Poteat (1938) , and Skilton (1943) review the case law extensively. Judiciaries declared many of the compulsory moratoria, and all those without clearly defined end dates were deemed unconstitutional because they violated the contracts clause. The courts of Idaho declared even a foreclosure holiday statute an unconstitutional impairment of contract (Poteat 1938 ). The to provide some relief to mortgagors by authorizing judges of the district courts to stay foreclosure suits and grant continuances, but the courts of Texas deemed this statute to also be unconstitutional (Poteat 1938) . In 1938 the Nebraska Supreme Court declared a similar statute enacted by the legislature in 1937 unconstitutional (Poteat 1938) . Even when judiciaries did not strike down a moratorium, they limited its scope or made clear in a ruling that they would not tolerate extensions of it. Iowa is perhaps the only case in which a judge instituted a moratorium: Judge Charles C. Bradley agreed not to sign any more foreclosures as a condition of his release after being kidnapped and beaten by several Iowa farmers (Skilton 1943) . Despite such threats to their own safety, justices in Iowa limited the scope of the legislature's moratorium statute (Poteat 1938) . Judges in Minnesota and Wisconsin also faced angry mobs at the courthouses (see, for example, New York Times 1933a , 1933b . It is in this climate that judges in Minnesota and Wisconsin declared these states' moratoria statutes, both of which had a limited time frame, constitutional.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have reviewed the history of America's mortgage laws. Aspects of mortgage law that develop in case law rarely change, while features of mortgage law determined by statute show more variation over time. Furthermore, to the extent that legislatures intervene in mortgage law, they do so in populist fashion. In contrast, judges limit the application of statutes abrogating creditor rights. Thus, while the history of mortgage law reveals fundamental differences between how laws are determined in case law and in civil code, it does not support the hypothesis that case law is inherently more flexible. theory in 1878 retained some vestige of it in 1995. Of the 21 states that followed title theory in 1878, only Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, and West Virginia were considered lien-theory states by 1995. The comparison shows how persistent legal foundations can be in a legal system based on case law such as the American system. Figure A1 shows that the states that followed title theory in 1879 were predominantly older states. Of the original 13 colonies, only New York, Georgia, and the Carolinas followed lien theory while, of the states incorporated after 1840, only Florida, Minnesota, and West Virginia followed title theory. The only states west of the Mississippi to follow title theory were Arkansas and Minnesota. The reason is that older states modeled their mortgage laws on British laws. In 1878, the British Empire continued to follow the title theory of mortgages, and Jones (1878) attributes the lien theory of mortgages to the 18th-century English barrister Lord Mansfield. New York led the way; as early as 1828, it was a lien-theory state. As a young state, California tried to emulate New York in its civil code (see, for example, Guidotti 1943) , which explains why it chose lien theory at an early date. Many still younger western states chose to follow California law, and so there is a much greater likelihood of following lien theory among the western states. 
